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 In his last text, On Certainty, Wittgenstein develops his 
ideas on skepticism and the limits of knowledge. At the end of his 
life, Wittgenstein sought to describe the structure of our 
knowledge and derive epistemological conclusions from his 
linguistic analysis of epistemic terms. His reflections on the 
notion of doubt and its role in our language allow him to 
distinguish knowledge from certainty, and to view skepticism in a 
new way. In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy 
succeeds or fails, we must first examine some of the difficulties 
surrounding his approach to skepticism. 
 
 
1. Analysis of the notion of "doubt" 
 
  A good way to understand the epistemological assertions that 
On Certainty contains, is to reflect upon Wittgenstein's analysis 
of the notion of doubt. The study of the role of "doubt" in our 
language and of the behaviours associated with the use of that 
term, allow Wittgenstein to view the problem of skepticism in a 
novel way. 
 Wittgenstein points out that the skeptical doubt is not, even 
if it seems to be, a radicalization of daily doubt. On the 
contrary, it is something rather different. Wittgenstein 
emphasizes that in the process that goes from doubting a 
particular something to doubting anything in general, our doubt 
looses gradually its meaning. At some point, it even ceases to be 
conceivable. 
 
For it is not true that a mistake merely gets more and more 
improbable as we pass from the planet to my own hand. No; at 
some point it has ceased to be conceivable. (54) 
 
 In my opinion, Wittgenstein's most interesting argument 
against global skepticism lies in his assertion that any doubt 
presupposses the command of a language game. That is, we can only 
doubt a proposition if we first understand what the proposition 
means. I can only deny that I know that this is a hand, if I have 
previously understood what it means to say that this is a hand. 
 
306: “I dont know if this is a hand·” But do you know what the 
word “hand” means? And don’t say “I know what it means now 
for me”. And isn’t it an empirical fact - that this word is 
used like this? 
 
 Wittgenstein states that understanding a proposition requires 
us to know how to use that proposition correctly. Hence, any doubt 
we may place about a proposition must take into account the 
language game in which that proposition is embedded. In other 
words, we cannot deny a proposition with independence of which are 
our linguistic practices. 
 
24:”What right have I not to doubt the existence of my hands?” … 
But someone who asks such a question is overlooking the fact 
that a doubt about existence only works in a language-game. 
Hence, that we should first have to ask: what would such a 
doubt be like? 
 
 As a result of this approach, Wittgenstein concludes that 
doubting must always come to an end. A speaker who raises 
questions without stopping at some point, does not abide by the 
rules that govern our communicative praxis. The game of questions 
and answers has its own rules, and they must be observed. At 
certain point, it makes no sense to raise further questions. Thus 
who does not cease to raise objections, does not play the game of 
doubting well. When the skeptic exercises his doubt without coming 
to an end, he places himself out of the language game in which 
doubting consists. 
 Hence, Wittgenstein appeals to our linguistic practices and 
the way we learn them, to show that we can doubt particular facts 
in particular circumstances, but that we cannot doubt them all at 
a time. In this manner, he shows that to sustain the skeptical 
doubt implies to reject our linguistic practices. But this 
possibility is not, of course, in our hand. It is important to 
clarify here that Wittgenstein does not refer to a mere incapacity 
on our side, but to an essential feature of our way of judging. 
 
232 “We could doubt every single one of these facts, but we could 
not doubt them all. Would n’t it be more correct to say: “we 
do not doubt them all”. Our not doubting them all is simply 
our manner of judging, and therefore of acting. 
 
450: A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt. 
 
247: What would it be like to doubt now whether I have two hands? 
Why can’t I imagine it at all? What would I believe if I 
didn’t believe that? So far I have no system at all within 
which this doubt might exist. 
 
 In the above paragraphs we have seen that doubts presupposse 
a language game. When we introduce a doubt within a language game, 
it has sense. But if we try to construct a doubt out of the 
language game in which we are embedded, or if we try to build a 
doubt against the language game as a whole, then our doubt will 
lack any sense. Wittgenstein's argumentations show that any doubt 
presupposses the existence of something that cannot be doubt, that 
is, doubts are possible only because certainty exists. The game of 
doubting presupposes certainty. 
 
115: If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as 
doubting anything. The game of doubting presupposes 
certainty. 
 
  Thus we arrive to the end of Wittgenstein's critique of 
skepticism. The core of his argumentation lies in asking the 
following: What kind of doubts does the skeptic raise? To which 
extent is it valid to insert those doubts in the language game in 
which we live? His answer to these interrogants emphasizes that 
some aspects of our thoughts cannot be doubted, since they are 
what allow us to construct our thoughts themselves, included the 
very formulation of any doubt. Thus the analysis of the skeptical 
doubt, its premises and consequences, allows him to prove that any 
doubt presuposses the existence of a field of certainty and hence, 
that skepticism cannot be the last word. 
 Of course, Wittgenstein's acceptance of the existence of 
certainty, forces us to clarify what he understands under that 
term. We must then determine what field of reality corresponds to 
what we evaluate as certain. I will turn to this point now. 
 
 
2. The field of certainty 
 
 Wittgenstein appeals to our common reaction against skeptical 
doubts to conclude that the skeptic's use of daily language is 
mistaken. We realize that something goes wrong with skeptical 
doubts when we are unable to sustain them. The skeptical doubt 
ceases to be meaningful to us as soon as we cannot back it 
anymore. 
 This remark involves a great discovery. At some point in the 
process of questioning whether a declaration is valid, we notice 
that we have touched ground. We find then that some propositions 
of our language stand so firmly in front of us that they are no 
longer questionable. [In the following, we will refer to this 
propositions as special or privileged propositions.] 
 
341: That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts 
depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from 
doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 
 
 The reason why there can be neither a doubt nor a proof of 
these special propositions, is that any question or argument we 
may try to develop, must start from the assumption of their 
validity. Thus any inquiry about the extension of our knowledge is 
built upon the validity of these special propositions, since 
everything we judge as knowledge presuposses them. To accept their 
validity is just the way we inquire about the limits of our 
knowledge. 
 It is important to stress that, according to Wittgenstein, 
these privileged propositions are not empirical. They lie at the 
foundations of our discourse and support all the other 
propositions we utter. Hence they are not a result of an empirical 
investigation, but what backs up that very inquiry. This means 
that whilst any other empirical proposition measures its validity 
in relation to the privileged propositions, the latter do not 
require further justification to be sustained. 
 
96: It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of 
empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as 
channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened 
but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that 
fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid. 
 
253: At the foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is 
not founded. 
 
 In effect, our language does not allow us neither to proof 
nor to review issues like, for example, the existence of our hands 
or of the earth. Since everytime we raise doubts about these facts 
"language goes on holiday", to use a metaphor of the Philosophical 
Investigations (1988, 38). In brief, the language game in which we 
are inmersed/plunged/embedded presupposses the existence of a set 
of propositions that are certain. This set of propositions govern 
our communicative practices as rules of discourse whose function 
is not so much to pass on information about the world as to 
organize our linguistic exchanges. In this sense, we can say that 
the special propositions we are talking about constitute the 
grammar of our language. 
 
57:Now might not “I know, I am not just surmising, that here is my 
hand” be conceived as a proposition of grammar? 
 
 Well, to clearly understand the status of these privileged 
propositions, I would suggest that we turn to a clasification that 
appeared already in Tractatus. Wittgenstein distinguished then 
three types of propositions: meaningful (sinnig), nonsensical 
(unsinnig) and senseless (sinnlos). I think the distinction can be 
useful when applied to the special propositions we are talking 
about. Wittgenstein meets the sphere of certainty when he reflects 
about the conditions of intelligibility of some propositions. He 
then discovers that the same sentence can have different 
conditions of intelligibility, which depend on the context in 
which the sentence is uttered. 
 Thus whether a proposition like "I know this is a hand" makes 
sense or not, depends upon the circumstances in which it is 
pronounced. If we introduce this sentence in a daily conversation 
as an empirical observation -- for example, if a victim utters 
these words after opening a package containing a bomb --, then it 
will be meaningful (sinnig), and will have a truth value ascribed 
to it. However, if we pronounce the sentence "I know this is a 
hand" in a philosophical discussion and interpret it as if it were 
an empirical proposition -- as the skeptic does --, the 
proposition becomes a nonsense (Unsinn). Finally, if we use the 
sentence in the context of a philosophical discussion and we 
interpret it as a grammatical rule -- as Wittgenstein does --, 
then it will lack any sense and will become senseless (sinnlos). 
 This comparision suggests that in On Certainty Wittgenstein 
constructs a tripartite classification of the sentences of our 
language as follows. First, sentences that are empirical, whose 
meaning and truth value depend upon the context in which we use 
them. That is the case of the sentence "I know this is a hand" 
when the victim pronounces it. Second, sentences that seem to be 
empirical but that, in certain contexts, become grammatical 
propositions. Such is the case of the above sentence when we 
introduce it in a discussion with the skeptic. Third, sentences 
which we may call philosophical that lack meaning under any 
circumstance. This is the case of a sentence like "There are 
physical objects". 
 The above distinctions about the way a sentence can have 
meaning or lack of it, play an important role in Wittgenstein's 
argument. Empirical propositions present no problem of 
interpretation when they are pronounced in the appropriate 
circumstances, since then they make all the sense. Philosophical 
sentences can also be straightforwardly evaluated, since according 
to Wittgenstein they are absurd in the sense specified. The real 
difficulty arises, however, in relation to the so-called 
grammatical propositions. To understand the way Wittgenstein 
solves the question about their role, we can draw a comparison 
between the role of grammatical propositions and the role of 
logical propositions. 
 In Tractatus Wittgenstein explained that logical propositions 
did not have sense. But in relation to them he introduced the 
important distinction between being nonsensical (unsinnig) and 
being senseless (sinnlos). Logical propositions are not absurd, 
but senseless, that is, they lack meaning at all. The assertion 
becomes clear when we remember Wittgenstein's definition of 
logical propositions as tautological (1987, 6.1) and certain 
(1987, 4.464). This description implies that nothing of what may 
happen in the world can ever affect them, neither to confirm nor 
to refute them (1987, 6.1222). For him logical propositions do not 
convey any information and say nothing (1987, 6.11). 
 We can now apply the definition of logical propositions to 
our understanding of the function of grammatical propositions in 
On Certainty. In Tractatus, Wittgenstein invested logical 
propositions with ontological relevance when he made them the 
formal framework of the world. Given that they are certain and 
tautological, they lack semantic content and must be considered 
meaningless. In a similar way, in On Certainty Wittgenstein 
considers grammatical propositions as the sintactical skeleton of 
our language. Given that they also form a certain and unchangeable 
structure, they do not transmit any information either and must 
also be considered meaningless. 
 Nonetheless, we must be very careful at this point. All these 
reflections could make us believe that the role of grammatical 
propositions in On Certainty is very similar to the role that 
logical propositions played in a former period of Wittgenstein's 
intellectual development. However, we should not trust excesively 
in the advantages of this identification, since there are 
essential differences between both types of sentences. In my 
opinion, these differences exhibit precisely to which extent the 
propositional treatment of the field of certainty poses 
insurmountable difficulties. 
 One of the differences is Wittgenstein's emphasis that the 
fact that grammatical propositions are certain, does not imply 
neither that they be true nor that they be false. This assertion 
implies that grammatical propositions are not tautologies in the 
sense in which logical propositions were. At the end of his life, 
Wittgenstein is convinced that a discussion about truth or 
falsehood does not fit in grammatical propositions. But, and this 
is my point, if we rule out the idea that grammatical propositions 
are true or false, it will not be possible to consider them 
"propositions" in a strict sense, since according to the classical 
definition a proposition is a linguistic expression that can bear 
a truth value. 
 A further point that should inspire us caution when comparing 
notions that belong to different periods of Wittgenstein's career, 
is the following. While logical propositions cannot be employed in 
the context of learning, some grammatical propositions can indeed 
be used to that purpose. Thus, while it does not make sense to 
tell a child "It rains or it does not rain", we can teach her 
something if we say "This is a hand". Before we have supposed that 
grammatical propositions are meaningless and do not convey any 
information. As we see it now, the role of these propositions is 
to rule our language games, that is, to establish the meaning of 
the set of propositions in our language. From this perspective, 
grammatical propositions do not lack sense or are meaningless, but 
they carry information about the way we use certain terms. Again, 
this difference points out to a key role of grammatical 
proposititions which does not fit well in their characterization 
as "propositions". 
 In effect, when Wittgenstein reflects upon the nature of the 
grammatical propositions, he realizes that what is truly important 
about them is not so much that they look like propositions, but 
that they contain the norms of our discourse and behaviour. We 
must therefore conclude that what we have called special 
propositions do not, in fact, belong to our language as an 
aditional element, but they are rather what hangs language 
together. This supports the idea that, in the final instance, 
Wittgenstein favored a non-propositional characterization of 
certainty. 
 It is at this stage that he appeals to a set of different 
phenomena that constitute the foundation of our thoughts, 
expressions and actions. He refers to them with different names 
like, for example, the inherited tradition, the community of 
origin, our behaviour, our animality, and even our mythology. All 
of which are non-intelectual phenomena that can perhaps be 
subsumed under the head of "facticity". Thus his inquiries led him 
to the verification of the existence of a sphere beyond language 
which includes an enormous variety of elements. Wittgenstein will 
use the term "certainty" to refer to that which backs all our 
thoughts, expressions and actions. The exploration of the rules of 
language refers us to a realm beyond language which can't be 
further analysed. The inquiry comes to an end when we understand 
that the field of certainty exists and constitutes us, but that we 
cannot explicit its nature. At the end, what is certain and why it 
is certain, remains beyond our understanding. 
 
 
3. Evaluation of the skeptical position 
 
 The conclusions we have reached above can guide us to 
understand Wittgenstein's answer to skepticism. As we have seen, 
Wittgenstein rejects the validity of the skeptical claim "I doubt 
whether the world exists because I don't know whether I am 
dreaming that the world exists". His argument shows that the 
skeptic's use of the terms "doubt", "know", "dream", and "world" 
is completely different from the normal use of the terms in the 
skeptic's community of origin. Wittgenstein's analysis reveals the 
extent to which the propositions that the skeptic tries to attack, 
function as certainties in our language. Through this criticism, 
Wittgenstein denies that an individual could state skeptical 
doubts about a particular use of language, since this use is 
legitimized by the community of speakers as a whole. 
 Wittgenstein's argument in this respect is impeccable, as has 
been emphasized by the secondary literature. As a result, it is 
generally believed that his linguistic analysis display that the 
skeptical challenge is no longer dangerous for epistemology. In my 
view, however, this conclusion is rather superficial and too 
optimistic, since Wittgenstein's approach to knowledge contains 
gaps which leave room for doubt. Wittgenstein suceeds in his 
reductio ad absurdum of skepticism when it is introduced at an 
individual level within daily practice. But it is less clear 
whether Wittgenstein's position can successfully confront a more 
severe type of skepticism. I mean the kind of skepticism which 
does not involve certain linguistic practices, but the system of 
language itself. 
 Wittgenstein discovered the importance of this second type of 
skepticism when he realized that the specificity of skepticism is 
not grasped when the skeptical attitude is described as a mere 
generalization of empirical doubt. On the contrary, the 
peculiarity of skepticism lies in the way it forces us to enquire 
about the rules of use of our language. This type of questioning 
about the use of language within a community appears, for example, 
when we ask ourselves how to identify the propositions that are 
certainties in that community. But despite his efforts to reject 
skepticism at this level, Wittgenstein was eventually obliged to 
admit that, in the final instance, it is impossible to identify 
these propositions. 
 The reason behind this conclusion is Wittgenstein's thesis 
that the same expression can have meaning in certain 
circumstances, whereas it has none in others. Thus it makes sense 
to say "I know that I have a hand" after opening a package 
containing a bomb, but most of the time the proposition "I have a 
hand" has an ascription of certainty. From this fact we can 
conclude that any questioning about whether a proposition is 
meaningful, about whether it can be known, and also about whether 
it is certain, demands further exploration of the circumstances in 
which the proposition is uttered. Therefore, the problem that the 
thesis of the diversity of senses raises is how to know in which 
circumstances it is appropriate to inmerse in a lively discussion 
about the meaning of a proposition or about its description as 
certain or as knowledge. 
 Now, -- and this is a delicate point -- when we try to 
connect language games with the circumstances that correspond to 
them, a serious obstacle appears. The setting requires us to pay 
attention to the conditions of use of our sentences or, what is 
the same, to appeal to "normal circumstances" as the framework in 
which our declarations fit. At this point, however, Wittgenstein 
recognizes that we do not possess --and even more significantly, 
that we cannot possess -- any method to distinguish under which 
circumstances a declaration of knowledge or of certainty is 
correct. 
 
27: If, however, one wanted to give something like a rule here, 
then it would contain the expression “in normal 
circumstances”. And we recognize normal circumstances but 
cannot precisely describe them. At most, we can describe a 
range of abnormal ones. 
 
 The proposition itself does not tell us neither when its 
insertion in some contexts is pertinent, nor when it is 
superfluous. Besides, any rule we may conceive to determine the 
context of use will have, according to Wittgenstein, an open 
character. If the "normal circumstances" under which we may use 
our sentences cannot be specified, that is, if there are no rules 
to use our propositions, then it is not possible to identify which 
propositions are certain. 
(......) 
 These considerations lead us to conclude that Wittgenstein's 
position cannot reject a type of skepticism whose objective is to 
warn us of the impossibility of understanding our own position in 
the world. This raises an interesting issue, that is, 
Wittgenstein's recognition of the limits of philosophical 
reflection. In this sense, one consequence of his analysis of 
epistemic terms is his thesis that it is impossible to justify the 
logic behind our language, and hence, we can only assume its 
facticity. 
 Now it is precisely on this issue that Wittgenstein gives the 
definite and certainly most polemical turn of the screw in his 
argumentation. He argues that the temptation to seek the 
foundations of our language games by looking for their finality or 
their essence, is mistaken. Linguistic analysis comes to an end 
when we recognize the existence of propositions that are certain. 
This means that it is not necessary to justify their certainty, on 
the contrary, it is sufficient to understand that they exist. In 
fact, this is the only movement which is valid philosophically. 
Ultimately, the idea that we cannot justify our system of meanings 
does not imply, according to Wittgenstein, that we can pose doubts 
about it. It makes no sense to think it might be false, in the 
same way that it makes no sense to think it might be true. 
 
 4. The limits of language and the philosophical task 
 
 Wittgenstein's assertion that first philosophy or metaphysics 
is impossible, and that we do not need to worry about this fact, 
inspires two different considerations about the possibilities of 
success of global skepticism. On the one hand, one could consider 
that the substratum of certainty shapes us in such a way that we 
lack the necessary perspective to grasp it from the outside. This 
approach would define global skepticism as unintelligible because 
no skeptical doubt would be able to eliminate our certainties. 
 On the other hand, one could consider that to suppose that 
there is an unattainable and unrefutable core of certainty 
implies, precisely, begging the question against skepticism. From 
this perspective, the postulation of a field of certainties would 
be a debatable strategy that cannot meet its objective of refuting 
skepticism. 
 The above dilemma leaves us with the problem of deciding 
which of the two positions is correct. In my opinion, once we have 
arrived at this point, any decision we might make implies begging 
the question. In other words, the reasons behind our decision do 
not need to be accepted by the two parties involved, i.e., the 
skeptic and his opponent. Thus the playing field is no longer a 
rational discussion, but a sphere prior to it. In accordance with 
a recurrent feature of Wittgenstein's thought, one might venture 
the hypothesis that the nature of this problem is, in fact, 
ethical. 
 To finish, I would like to highlight a feature that has 
traditionally defined the philosophical task, i.e., the fact that 
the philosopher sometimes asked without awaiting a response, or 
without aspiring to achieve it. In the eyes of the traditional 
epistemologist, the discussion about skepticism showed that the 
inquiry about knowledge was legitimate, even if there was no 
definite annswer to it. Wittgenstein belongs to that same 
tradition in which while the philosopher is well aware of the 
limits of human knowledge, he still takes seriously the 
possibility of inquiring. In relation to this point, we must 
recall the important category of nonsense (unsinnig) but valuable 
of Tractatus. The problem of skepticism belongs to the same field 
of reality as the mystical. 
 In any case, Wittgenstein's discussion about skepticism 
shows, in my opinion, that philosophical questions are worth 
researching. Our last reaction may be silence but to arrive to 
this conclusion it is necessary to cover previously a long 
argumentative path. 
